Socrates as Hoplite by Anderson, Mark
Ancient Philosophy 25 (2005) 
©Mathesis Publications 
Socrates as Hoplite 
Mark Anderson 
273 
' ... and their kings must be those who have become the best in both philosophy and war' 
(Plato, Republic 543a my trans. here and throughout) 
Socrates' military career has always been something of an enigma. Plato's 
Apology indicates that he fought in the battles of Potidaea, Delium, and 
Amphipolis (28e). But no one has known quite what to make of a Socrates in 
hoplite armor. There is no comprehensive account of his military career in con-
nection with his moral and political commitments and his conception of the good 
life. A suitably detailed and contextualized portrait of Socrates' relation to Athe-
nian hoplite culture may provide insight into the life he chose to live and, thus, 
into his character. And this may be significant in the case of such an exemplary 
figure from whom we learn to reflect on life and how to live it. 
Socrates' military service is one of the few items in his biography that is 
secure. The details of this service are noteworthy for this reason alone. But it 
must also be the case, given the nature of hoplite warfare, that this was no minor 
biographical detail. The specific battles in which Socrates fought, and the 
broader campaigns associated with two of them, were charged with political sig-
nificance. The expedition to Potidaea probably consumed close to three years of 
his life. The engagements at Delium and Amphipolis ended in Athenian defeats. 
The latter conflict, resulting as it did in the deaths of Cleon and Brasidas, the two 
men most eager for war in Athens and Sparta, helped pave the way for the Peace 
of Nicias in 421. Moreover, these events occurred in the context of an ugly war in 
the course of which all parties involved conducted themselves more and more in 
a manner that could only be called-and frequently was called-unjust and dis-
honorable. Everything we know about Socrates leads us to believe that he 
reflected deeply upon the relevance of hoplite culture to the pursuit of the good 
life. 
Contemporary scholars often note that Socrates served as a hoplite; yet those 
who proceed to characterize the man and his relation to his world rarely take fur-
ther notice of this fact. Nehamas 2000,8, for instance, seeks insight into the good 
life by examining Socrates as a literary figure. The Socrates appearing in litera-
ture is often a hoplite; indeed, it is primarily from this literature that we know of 
his military life. I Neharnas 2000, 7 notes that Plato's Socrates 'consistently 
J It is of course a question how much we can learn about the historical Socrates from the 
Socrates depicted by writers such as Plato and Xenophon. But it seems to me that we can hardly avoid 
drawing conclusions about the man from the portrait. For if we press our scruples on this point too 
far, we must abandon all hope of saying anything significant about even his philosophical commit-
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exemplifies' the view that one should do only what one believes to be right, with-
out wavering. Nevertheless, he never seriously considers what Plato's portrait of 
Socrates as hoplite might tell us about what he believed to be right and good. 2 
Those few who have reflected on the broader implications of Socrates' relation 
to Athenian hoplite culture have consistently overlooked the details of his partic-
ipation in that culture. Nietzsche, for example, has much to say about Socrates 
and Greek militarism; but almost none of it is based on the facts of Socrates' ser-
vice. Gregory Vlastos considers the subject in several places; but he grounds his 
account upon a fundamentally inaccurate characterization of Socrates' military 
life. More recently, Brickhouse and Smith have distanced Socrates from Athe-
nian military culture. But their account is reminiscent of Vlastos', and suffers 
from some of the same flaws. I intend to show how these scholars have miscon-
strued Socrates' military career by comparing what they have to say with what 
we can establish about Socrates' involvement in Athenian hoplite culture. 
We begin with Nietzsche, a critic whose negative view of Socrates has capti-
vated large segments of the academic and intellectual communities. Nietzsche 
denounces Socrates as the anti-aristocratic, anti-military-man par excellence. He 
claims that 'the [Athenian] adherents of the "good old times'" held Socrates 
responsible for the dramatic decline of 'the old Marathonian stalwart fitness of 
body and soul' (Nietzsche 2000, 86).3 According to Nietzsche's account, 
Socrates almost single-handedly transformed the Greeks from heroic warriors 
into moralizing rationalists. Indeed, he was the fullest manifestation of a world-
historical break between the mores of traditional aristocratic Greek society and a 
metaphysically grounded morality that would eventually produce a decadent 
world of plebian anti-heroism. Nietzsche plays up Socrates' low birth and 
accuses him of harboring ressentiment against his betters; he characterizes 
Socratic dialectic as a knife thrust into the heart of old Athens and her noble tra-
ditions. In short, Nietzsche condemns Socrates as 'pseudo-Greek, anti-Greek' 
ments. After all, what we know of his moral philosophy, for example, is as dependent upon the litera-
ture as are the more mundane facts of his life. Even the less stylized writings of later ancients on 
whose work we draw for information were themselves hased upon the earlier more overtly literary 
accounts. This situation is perhaps unavoidable given the propensity of Socrates' contemporary fol-
lowers and admirers to portray him through the medium of 100Kpa:nKo{ AOYOL Nietzsche's frequent 
condemnations of Socrates are clearly directed at the historical figure, and are as clearly based upon 
Plato's literary accounts. Even the admirable attempt in Vlastos 1991,45-106 to justify his inferences 
from literature to history can only be provisional. I intend to take the literary accounts as evidence for 
historical facts where they are consistent with one another and are not obviously serving purely liter-
aryends. 
2 Nehamas' case is not unusual. May 2000 includes a section on the historical Socrates. Yet there 
is no consideration of his hoplite service. May mentions Socrates' military career, of course, but only 
to make a point about his relation to Athenian democracy. The silence that surrounds Socrates' mili-
tary career may contrihute to the surprise, even the shock, that students express upon first hearing the 
details of Socrates' military service. Familiar with Socrates' name, they imagine him only as a 
teacher or a spiritual reformer along the lines of the Buddha or Jesus. Thus his role as a hoplite war-
rior comes as quite a revelation. 
3 Nietzsche evidently has in mind Aristophanes' Clouds 985-989. 
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(Nietzsche 1976,474). 
Ironically, Socrates' most influential admirer reinforces certain aspects of 
Nietzsche's critical portrait. But when Gregory Vlastos repeatedly emphasizes 
Socrates' supposed anti-militarism, he does so in a spirit of praise. Vlastos for-
mulates this aspect of his account by exaggerating the implications of Socrates' 
statement in Crito 48b that one must never do injustice. From this statement he 
derives and attributes to Socrates a 'moral revolution', the centerpiece of which 
is indeed a very anti-Greek sort of pacifism. Ancient Greek morality was 'grossly 
discriminatory in conduct toward personal enemies'; it glorified 'lhJarming one's 
enemy to the full extent permitted by public law' (Vlastos 1991, 179-180).4 
Socrates, in contrast, was guided by an 'undeviatingly beneficent goodness' 
(Vlastos 1991, 197). He was, says Vlastos, committed to the view that 
true moral goodness is incapable of doing intentional injury to 
others, for it is inherently beneficent, radiant in its operation, 
spontaneously communicating goodness to those who have 
come into contact with it, always producing benefit instead of 
injury, so that the idea of ajust man injuring anyone, friend or 
foe, is unthinkable (Vlastos 1991, 196-197). 
The core of Socrates' moral revolution lay in the universal applicability of some-
thing like the above principle. Socrates supposedly refused to discriminate 
between friends and enemies: a just man must never injure anyone. Socrates, 
writes Vlastos, was 'the first Greek to grasp in full generality lthe I simple and 
absolutely fundamental moral truth' that 'if someone has done a nasty thing to 
me this does not give me the slightest moral justificationj(Jr doing the same nasty 
thing, or any nasty thing, to him' (Vlastos 1991, J 90).5 
Vlastos frequently frames Socrates' 'rejection of retaliation' as a repudiation 
of certain aspects of contemporary Athenian military culture (see, e.g., Vlastos 
1991. 184-185, 191-192, and 197; 1987, 127-133; and 1974, 33-34). This culture 
was characterized by traditional Greek military practices such as the lex talionis 
and the preemptive strike (Vlastos 1991, 180-186). One of the most notorious 
representatives of this culture was C1eon, the Athenian demagogue and general. 
Vlastos illustrates Socrates' revolution by contrasting the two men. Cleon lived 
and died by the tatio; Socrates rejected it. Consider, for example. Cleon's con-
4 Vlastos docs not distinguish between personal and state enemies. Tn his chapter on Socrates' 
rejection of retaliation he refers to both types of enemies indiscriminately. In Vlastos 1987 he dis-
cusses the {u/io exclusively in military terms. This may be less than rigorous: yet the Greeks them-
selves did not always mind this linguistic distinction. Blundell 199 L 39 informs us that 'polemios 
came into regular usc for a strictly military enemy, but echthros, always the regular word for a per-
sonal enemy. remained in use alongside polemios for enemies in war. for example in treaties ... Con-
versely polemios is sometimes (though less often) used for personal enemies'. She notes also that one 
of the primary senses of <piA.o~ is political. That is, onc's <pl/cO! were one's fellow citizens. From this 
sense grew the notion of love of country (43-44). 
5 Vlastos construes Socrates' injunction to avoid injustice much more broadly than Plato himself 
did. In Laws 829a Plato wrote that one must not act unjustly specifically in connection with the need 
to train citizens for war. 
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demnation of Mytilene. After the suppression of an oligarchic revolt in Mytilene, 
Cleon convinced the Athenians to execute the city's adult male citizens and to 
sell the women and children into slavery. Vlastos imagines a counter-factual situ-
ation in which Socrates is commanded to communicate the order of execution to 
the captain of the ship bound for Mytilene. He argues that Socrates would have 
refused to participate, for two reasons: first, the proposed punishment was 
unprecedented in its ferocity, nearly genocidal, and barbaric (Vlastos 1974,33); 
second, it was indiscriminate inasmuch as it condemned the innocent democrats 
along with the renegade oligarchs. Vlastos concludes that Socrates, had he been 
commanded to do so, would have declined even to relay the orders to those 
charged with carrying out the executions (Vlastos 1974, 33-34).6 
Vlastos directly connects Socrates' revolution to Cleon's treatment of other 
rebellious cities. When Scione and Torone revolted, Cleon persuaded the Atheni-
ans to crush them, execute or imprison the adult male citizens, and enslave the 
women and children? Vlastos draws a thick, dark line between Cleon's treatment 
of these cities and Socrates' own moral position. Cleon and the Athenians who 
followed him were motivated by the talio. Socrates was not. His 'rejection of 
retaliation' was a 'surgical excision ofthat malignancy in the traditional morality 
that surfaces in actions like the genocide Athens had all but inflicted on Mytilene 
and then, as the war dragged on, did inflict on Scione, Torone, and Melos' (Vlas-
tos 1991, 197). 
Brickhouse and Smith reaffirm this image by presenting Socrates as a man 
who repudiated the aggression and violence that were so much a part of his 
world. Though on many issues they disagree with Vlastos, they share his concern 
to show that Socrates would never have intentionally acted unjustly toward 
another man. To this end they argue that if he ever had acted unjustly, he would 
have done so only under the sort of circumstances that would relieve him of all 
responsibility (Brickhouse and Smith 1994, 151-154; 2000, 212-216). Even so, 
they are confident that Socrates never had to confront such a problem. Tn their 
words, 'there is no reason to think that Socrates was ever asked to carry out a 
legal order to engage in any of the many evils the city of Athens committed. Nor 
is there any reason to think that Socrates ever actively supported the commission 
of any of those evils' (Brickhouse and Smith 1994, 154). 
" Note that Vlastos portrays Socrates' 'revolution' in quite general terms. He writes indiscrimi-
nately of 'being unjust'. 'injuring'. 'doing something nasty to' someone. etc. His project is not to for-
mulate the precise nature of Socrates' moral commitments based upon an examination of the Greek 
terms involved. Rather, he is investigating the relationship between a generalized version of Socrates' 
'do nothing unjust' prescription and the practice of warfare. This is not to say that there is no work to 
be done by way of sorting out the different expressions Socrates employs in the Crito in this context. 
But, as I say, this is not Vlastos' project. Nor is it mine. My argument is that whatever Socrates meant 
by the words he used to express his moral commitments, those commitments were compatible with 
Athenian militarism. Therefore, some interpretations of his morality (such as those produced by Niet-
zsche and Vlastos in particular) must be ruled out. 
7 Scione's adult males were executed; Towne's were imprisoned. Vlastos uses these examples in 
1991,197 and 1987, 130 and 133. 
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Brickhouse and Smith. like Vlastos before them, acknowledge that Socrates 
declined to oppose the Athenians' imperial and military aggressiveness. But they 
resist any intimation of support or complicity. Vlastos 1987 reasons that Socrates 
did not denounce the condemnation of Mytilene-and the similar treatment 
meted out to Scione, Torone, and Melos-because it was a public matter, to be 
decided in the assembly. whereas Socrates' philosophical effort was a private 
affair among small numbers of friends or intimates. Brickhouse and Smith 1994, 
153-154 follow Vlastos completely here. If Socrates had any moral culpability it 
was only to the extent that his 'political passivity' prevented him from rising in 
the assembly to dissuade the Athenians from their brutal plans. 
The facts of Socrates' military career do not square with the above interpreta-
tions. Hardly a passive observer, Socrates actively supported Athens' imperial 
war effort. As we shall see, he willingly fought with some of the men and on 
some of the very campaigns that the standard accounts assure us he would have 
condemned. Moreover, the extent of his military activity is much wider than any-
one has recognized. The relevant evidence demonstrates that Socrates fought in 
many more battles than the three that are commonly acknowledged. On the Poti-
daean campaign alone he may have seen action at Therme. Pydna. Beroea, and 
Strepsa. Before returning to Athens he probably served at Spartolus and 'other 
places' (Thucydides ii 70.4). On the Amphipolitan expedition he served possibly 
at Mende, definitely (for a time, though perhaps for a very brief time only) at 
Scione, then at Torone. Gale, Singus, Mecyherna, Thyssus, Cleonae, Acroathos, 
Olophyxus, Stageira, Bormiscus, Galepsos, and Trailus. There may have been 
more. As far as I can determine, no one has ever pointed this out. Nor has anyone 
closely examined the conditions of his service, or his possible motivations. Had 
this been done, readings such as those offered by Nietzsche and Vlastos would 
have been seen for what they are: untenable. As far as we can tell from the avail-
able evidence, Socrates was not a pleb who destroyed Athenian aristocratic cul-
ture out of envy and spite; nor was he the founder of a pacifist revolution. To the 
contrary, he specifically did not associate with members of his own social class. 
He eagerly cultivated relationships among the Athenian warrior caste, the 
KaAoKaya90i,8 He adopted their manners and traditions. Like them, he respected 
and lived by the mores of Athenian hoplite culture.9 
In the summer of 432 the Athenians assisted Corcyra in a naval engagement 
8 These associations have led many to ask about Socrates' connection to radical oligarchy. This, 
I believe, is a red herring. The relevant point is that Socrates shared many of the cultural ideals of the 
hoplite class, which included moderate- and even non-oligarchic enemies of the radical democracy. 
9 For Socrates' interest in KaAoKaya8ia, see Plato Symp. 222a: Xenophon Mon. i 1.16. 2.2-3, 
6.13-14, iv 7.1, and 8.11. For the connection between KaAoKaya8ia and war, see Plato Rep. 376c and 
Laches 192c; Xenophon Mem. ii 6.27 and Oec. 11.17 and 19. In Memorabilia iii Socrates exhibits a 
keen interest in the art of the general and in those Athenians who aspired to the position. Socrates and 
his followers seem to have displayed an admiration for Sparta's military culture (see Aristophanes 
Birds 1280-1283). Cartledge 1999, 317 has suggested that Socrates may have been 'a laconiser of 
both the pragmatic-political and the political-theoretical kinds'. 
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against Corinth. 10 Expecting the Corinthians to retaliate by inciting rebellion 
among their colonies, some of which were tributary subjects of their empire, the 
Athenians mounted a campaign against one of them, Potidaea. They demanded 
that the Potidaeans tear down a section of their city wall and turn out their 
Corinthian magistrates (i 56.2). Refusing to submit, the Potidaeans secured a 
promise of aid from Sparta and revolted. That summer the Athenians dispatched 
two contingents to put down the rebellion and to pacify the surrounding region. 
The first group captured Therme and then laid siege to Pydna, where the second 
group joined them. Together they assaulted Beroea and Strepsa and finally 
advanced on Potidaea (i 61.2-4). 
The battle at Potidaea was brief but fierce. One hundred fifty Athenians were 
killed, including their general Callias. The Potidaeans and their allies lost 
approximately three hundred (i 63.3). After the fighting the Potidaeans withdrew 
into the city, to which the Athenians immediately laid siege. The citizens perse-
vered for two years. By the winter of 430/29 they could resist no longer. Thucy-
dides reports that in the end 'the grain had run out; and besides the many other 
things that had already befallen them concerning the need for food, some even 
ate each other' (ii 70.1). Under the terms of the surrender the surviving Poti-
daeans were exiled for life. 
The Athenians remained in their camp at Potidaea until the summer, at which 
time they campaigned against several other cities in the Chalcidice. They had 
reason to believe that Spartolus would be betrayed to them, so they advanced on 
the city and proceeded to burn the crops. The Olynthians, however, Spartolus' 
neighbors to the east, raised a force to help defend the city. Upon arriving in 
Spartolus they joined ranks with the locals and attacked the Athenians. The Chal-
cidian cavalry and light -armed troops fought well against the Athenians' own 
horse and peltasts; but the Athenian infantry repelled their hoplites. The Chalcid-
ians, therefore, retired behind the walls of Spartolus. Yet it was not long before 
they received fresh reinforcements, and the combined forces launched another 
attack. This time, the Chalcidian cavalry and peltasts harassed the Athenians to 
such a degree that they panicked and fled back to their camp at Potidaea. They 
lost four hundred thirty men, along with all of their generals. The survivors 
requested and received permission to collect their dead, after which they headed 
home for Athens (ii 79.1-7). 
It was sometime during this Potidaean campaign that Socrates famously res-
cued Alcibiades in battle. 11 As Alcibiades recounted the incident in Plato's Sym-
10 The following account, unless otherwise indicated, is based upon Thucydides. 
J I There appear to be problems with the chronology, based upon the wording (or the inferences 
typically drawn from the wording) at the beginning of the Charmides. In that dialogue Socrates, who 
has just returned home from the camp at Potidaea. encounters friends who ask him about a battle 
there in which he had participated shortly before (OAlYOV ... 1tplV) he left. If we take this to be the bat-
tle of Potidaea, which occurred at the very beginning of the campaign, then Socrates' remarks about 
encountering youths upon his return who were not yet grown up when he left, and Charmides' remark 
that he remembers Socrates from his childhood, are baffling. Yet the text of the dialogue does not 
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posium, 'none other than [Socrates] saved me. He refused to abandon me when I 
was wounded and saved both me and my armor' (Svmp. 220e). From this we can 
infer that Socrates fought in or very near the front lines. He was certainly close 
enough to the action to come to the rescue of a wounded Alcibiades before the 
enemy could dispatch him. If Alcibiades had been wounded and was in mortal 
danger, the fighting around him must have been severe. 12 Socrates did not hesi-
tate. He stood in front of his friend and defended him from the enemy (Plutarch 
Alcibiades 7.3 ).13 Alcibiades thought Socrates' actions so heroic as to merit the 
decoration for bravery (Symp. 220e). 
Recall the Nietzschean image of Socrates, which contrasts Socratic rationalism 
to Athenian militarism. This cannot be right, for Socrates himself fought in the 
service of empire. When the Corinthians addressed the members of the Pelopon-
nesian League, calling for war to save Potidaea, they twice condemned Athens as 
a Tupavvoc; 1tOAtC;, a tyrant state (i 122.3, 124.3). Pericles himself openly 
declared that the Athenians were fighting for the preservation of a tyranny, and 
even suggested that its acquisition had been unjust (ii 63.2). His decision to 
attack Potidaea was occasioned not by Potidaean aggression but by strategic con-
siderations regarding a third party, Corinth (i 44.2; Kagan 1969, 273-285). When 
the Potidaeans resisted, the Athenians beat and starved them into submission. 
They besieged and/or reduced several other cities as well. There is a record of 
Socrates on this campaign. We know that during the long siege he stood out 
among the soldiers as something of an eccentric (Symp. 21ge-220e). We hear 
nothing, however, of his standing out as a moral revolutionary suggestively ques-
tioning his comrades about the justice of Pericles' military aggression. That 
demand that we interpret it as referring to the battle of Potidaea, which occurred in the summer of 
432. I suggest that the battle that had just occurred was in fact the battle at Spartolus, which took 
place near Potidaea (near enough that upon being routed the Athenians retreated to their camp at Poti-
daea), and that did in fact take place just prior to the Athenians' departure and return home. More-
over, as we have seen, the Athenians lost over four hundred men in this battle, which makes it much 
more lethal than the actual battle of Potidaea. This would explain why Chaerephon notes a report that 
the fighting was 'very severe' and that many of their friends had died (l53c). Between the actual bat-
tle of Potidaea and this battle a contingent of sixteen hundred hoplites arrived at Potidaea. If Socrates 
was with this group, then we can rule out his having fought at Therme, Pydna. Beroea, Strepsa, and, 
indeed, at the battle of Potidaea. If, however, we take seriously his comment in the Apology that he 
stood at his station and faced death at Potidaea, then we must conclude that he was with one of the 
two contingents that arrived at the beginning of the campaign. In that case, he would have served for 
the duration. I believe that we can take his remark in the Apology seriously. since he seems there to be 
referring to specific (and famous) battles. 
12 For the severity of the fighting over a fallen man and his armor see Iliad xvii. Homeric combat 
was not identical to classical hoplite combat, but the comparison is helpful. 
13 Plutarch uses the word Ct.~UvOl, to 'defend' or 'fend off hom'. This word need not suggest a 
purely defensive posture. Plutarch employs it often to designate a real fight. See, for example, his 
Aristides 17.7, Theseus 11.1, Ciman 17.3, and Nicias 21.5. Homer, too, often uses it to mean 'fight in 
defense of'. For example, in Iliad xiii 461 ff. there is a fight over the body and armor of Alkathoos. 
Aineias 'defends' the body against Idomeneus and Idomeneus' friends 'defend' him against Aineias 
and other Trojans. The result is an all-out fight on both sides. In the Platonic Alcibiades USb Alcibi-
ades says that many men die trying to rescue their friends and relatives in battle. 
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Socrates, so far as we know, raised no objections to serving on this campaign 
suggests that neither militarism nor imperialism violated his conception of the 
noble and good life. 
The next battle for which we have evidence of Socrates' presence occurred six 
years after the fall of Potidaea. He was with the Athenians at Delium when a 
large Boeotian army put them to flight after a particularly bloody melee. 14 The 
Athenian right wing routed the Boeotian left, crushing the Thespians and sur-
rounding and butchering the troops next to them (iv 96.3 ).15 On the other side of 
the field, however, the Thebans prevailed. Their commander, Pagondas, dis-
patched two cavalry units to the aid of his collapsing left wing. Mistaking these 
reinforcements for a large army, the Athenians panicked, scattered, and retreated 
in disarray (iv 96.5-6). The Boeotians pursued them and cut down nearly one 
thousand men before breaking off the chase at nightfall (iv 101.2). 
In Plato's Symposium Alcibiades tells of Socrates' composure during the 
retreat. While fighting raged all around him, he led a small contingent of hoplites, 
Laches included, safely out of the slaughter. Alcibiades, from the relative safety 
of his horse, had occasion to observe Socrates' demeanor, and he later recalled 
that he had been calm, alert, and had the look of a man who would fight back 
mightily if challenged (Symp. 221a-b). This event might well have inspired 
Nicias' advice in the Laches that young men should practice fighting in armor. 
Such training, he says, will be most advantageous after the collapse of a phalanx, 
when a man must attack a retreating enemy or defend himself against pursuers. It 
will also give him an appearance more terrifying to the enemy (Laches 182a). 
Two years after Delium Socrates joined another expedition north, the details of 
which are as surprising as they are illuminating. 16 In the summer of 422 he 
accompanied Clean on a wide-ranging campaign to restore Athens' imperial pos-
sessions in and around the Chalcidice and Thrace. Several cities were in open 
rebellion and others had fallen to the Spartans under Brasidas. Clean, determined 
to punish and reclaim them, successfully proposed a decree calling for the execu-
tion of the Scionians (iv 122.6). Shortly thereafter the Mendaeans revolted (iv 
t4 Seven thousand Athenian hoplites were present, accompanied by a small cavalry (iv 94.1). 
The Boeotians, led by the Thebans, had in addition to their own seven thousand hoplites, one thou-
sand cavalrymen and ten thousand unarmored soldiers (iv 93.3). 
15 If it is true that generals usually fought in the front ranks and on the right wing, then Socrates 
may have fought in this part of the battle. He was with Laches during the retreat, which suggests that 
he fought near him in the original battle. Laches was not a general at Delium. though he had held that 
position in the past. See Hanson 2000, 107-116; Hanson 1995, 489n19. But see Wheeler 1993. 
t6 The following account is based upon, (a) Socrates' assertion in the Apology that he stood in 
the battle lines at Amphipolis; (b) Thucydides' account of the expedition that culminated in that bat-
tle; and, (c) West and Meritt 1925. See also Woodhead 1960. That Socrates fought in the famous bat-
tle at Amphipolis in 422 is almost universally agreed to be the case. If this is true, then the account in 
the text of his service with Cleon, as surprising as it may be, must follow. Less than a handful of 
scholars have suggested that Socrates must have been referring in the Apology to some other battle at 
Amphipolis. Their case, however, is less than convincing. For a discussion and criticism of this 
denial, see Calder 1961. 
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123.1-3). Enraged, the Athenians dispatched one thousand hoplites to reduce the 
cities (iv 129.2). They descended on Mende first. When the city gates were 
thrown open on the second day of the assault, the soldiers pillaged the city and 
very nearly massacred the citizens (iv 130.1-7). From Mende they moved south 
to Scione, where, after defeating the Scionian and Peloponnesian garrison, they 
laid siege to the city (iv 131.1-2). The following summer Cleon himself sailed 
north with twelve hundred hoplites. Socrates may very well have been fighting 
outside Scione with the first contingent. If not, he sailed out of Athens with 
Cleon. After putting in at Scione to collect reinforcements, Cleon and his men 
(Socrates now definitely included) sailed to Torone, where they overpowered the 
garrison and took the survivors captive. They enslaved the women and children, 
and sent the men to Athens as prisoners (v 3.2-4). After the fall of Torone, Brasi-
das abandoned the Sithonian peninsula for a more secure position at Amphipolis. 
The Athenians took advantage of his absence by capturing several other cities, 
including Gale, Singus, and Mecyherna. The cities on the Athos peninsula, 
among them Thyssus, Cleonae, Acroathos, and Olophyxus, may have submitted 
without significant resistance. 
After securing the Chalcidice the Athenians proceeded to Eion. On the way 
they stormed Stageira17 and reduced the strategically important Bormiscus.l8 
From Eion they pushed west, taking Galepsos and the much larger Trailus. 
Returning to Eion they settled in and awaited an opportunity to move against 
Brasidas in Amphipolis. Cleon stalled. When finally he led his men out to recon-
noiter the surrounding area, he was informed that Brasidas was preparing to 
attack. Caught off guard, Cleon hastily attempted to organize a retreat. As his 
troops wheeled around to withdraw, the Peloponnesians sallied out and rushed 
them from the rear. The stunned Athenians scattered. Many joined ranks on a hill 
and with spears and swords beat back repeated assaults. Finally, unable to with-
stand the barrage of missiles the cavalry and the peltasts launched against them, 
they disbanded and fled into the hills (v 10.7-10). Six hundred Athenians died in 
the melee (v 11.2), Cleon among them (v 10.9). 
Cleon was ruthless; he was brutal to rebellious cities; but Athens needed him. 
The empire in the north was crumbling; much of Thrace was in open rebellion. 
The Athenians were livid (iv 122.5, 123.3). The punishment from which they had 
spared the citizens of Mytilene they imposed upon the defeated Scionians, at 
Cleon's insistence. They retaliated against Torone almost as severely. Thucy-
dides did not record the sufferings of the many other cities that fell to Cleon' s 
army, but we may be sure that they too felt the bronze edge of the lex talionis. 19 
In the end, though it cost him his life, Cleon's northern campaign was extraordi-
17 Stageira survived. One wonders whether Aristotle's grandfather was resident in the city at the 
time and, if so, how the history of philosophy might have been altered had Stageira fallen. 
18 The Athenians might have assaulted these cities after encamping at Eion. 
19 The Athenians' conduct at Mende may provide a hint. During the Peloponnesian War 'The 
normal practice when a state was overrun was (l) the seizure of all women and children, (2) the 
seizure of all slaves, (3) the slaughter or seizure of all defeated military men' (Pritchett 1971, 81). 
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narily successful. Thanks to his efforts, '[tlhe coast of Thrace from Aenus to Pal-
lene had been reorganized, much of it reconquered' (West and Meritt 1925, 69). 
Socrates' lengthy service with Cleon does not fit comfortably into the popular 
image. Vlastos overlooks it when he cites the Athenians' treatment of Scione and 
Torone as examples of paradigmatical1y anti-Socratic aggression. When Brick-
house and Smith 1994, 153-154 declare that Socrates never actively supported 
Athens' 'evil' acts, they do so expressly in connection with the Athenians' treat-
ment of Scione. But Socrates may very well have been with the contingent that 
stom1ed Scione in the summer of 423. Or he may have sailed with Cleon the fol-
lowing summer. Either way, he served at Scione and he arrived there in full 
knowledge of the campaign's objectives; he knew that the men were to beexe-
cuted and the women and children enslaved. Thus the assertion that Socrates 
never participated in Athens' 'evil actions' cannot be correct. If he were under a 
legal obligation to serve on these campaigns, then Brickhouse and Smith have 
gone wrong again. If, as I believe, he served willingly and eagerly, their error is 
compounded. 
Fighting with the infantry was not something into which every Athenian citi-
zen was thrust by necessity. A long tradition strictly regulated admission into 
hoplite ranks according to family wealth. In the archaic period, for example, one 
had to be a member of the SEuYlt'tat, one of Solon's four property classes, which 
required a significant annual agricultural income. Hoplite status may have later 
been regulated according to the worth of one's total property, but the income 
requirement would still have been high (Hanson 1995, 296). Socrates would not 
have qualified for hoplite service under either of these arrangements. Sometime 
during the Peloponnesian War, however, the requirements seem to have been sig-
nificantly relaxed. Still, even under these circumstances, not just any man could 
serve as a hoplite. He had to have the resources to buy the panoply. Most hop lites 
were farmers, men who owned and turned a profit from their own land. 2o Poor 
20 Hoplite annor was not so expensive that it was limited to only the wealthiest segment of soci-
ety. Still, it was beyond the means of thousands of citizens, mostly laborers like Socrates, who could 
serve only on the fleet. In the fifth century the cost of the panoply was approximately one to three 
hundred drachmas (Hanson 1999, 227). Assuming steady employment, the average laborer could 
expect to earn around three hundred drachmas a year. Annual expenses for a family of four totaled 
anywhere from two hundred eighty to over three hundred drachmas (Rosivach 1992,52 and 64n60). 
In other words, the annual income of an average laborer would have barely supported a family of 
four. At some point, too, Socrates had to support another wife and a third son. It seems unlikely. 
therefore, that he would have had the resources to spend on hoplite equipment. Consider also that 
Socrates does not seem to have worked nearly as much as an average laborer. Indeed, at his trial he 
doubted whether he could scrape together one hundred drachmas (Ap. 38b); he claimed, in fact, to 
have no money (37c). In Xenophon's Oeconomicus Socrates says that his property, including his 
house, is worth only five minae (2.3), or five hundred drachmas. Hanson 1995, 296 notes that the 
panoply was worth about three months salary of the poorest citizens; yet this is a purely abstract point 
and does not take into account primary living expenses. His actual contention is that the panoply was 
affordable for the average farmer (and not confined to the wealthiest landowners), a man worth 
around two or three thousand drachmas (Hanson 1995, 487n8). Hanson 1995. 249 recognizes that, 
practically speaking, the panoply was 'beyond the reach of the poor'. 
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men did not join the infantry: they could neither purchase nor maintain the neces-
sary equipment. This is why thousands of Athenian citizens rowed in the fleet or 
served as light- or un-armed attendants on the phalanx21 Socrates was notori-
ously indigent. Had he lived like the average Athenian laborer, he would have 
been confined to service on the fleet. 22 
So how-and why-did Socrates come to possess the equipment necessary for 
qualification as a hoplite? It is unlikely that he inherited it from his father, who 
was poor himself (see, e.g., Laches 186c). Moreover, in Sophroniscus' day there 
may very well have been regulations in place that would have barred him from 
acquiring hoplite armor (Hanson 1995, 299). Perhaps Socrates saved his money 
in order to purchase his panoply.23 If so, this would have taken time and determi-
nation, which would suggest that he very much wanted to serve as a hoplite. Per-
haps he solicited the necessary funds from his wealthy friends. This, too, would 
evidence a commitment to hoplite service. In sum, whether he saved his money 
or borrowed it from friends, he was not required to buy the panoply; he did not 
have to be a hoplite. However Socrates came by his arms and armor, he voluntar-
ily chose his way of war. 
Even after he had acquired the panoply, Socrates would not have been subject 
to a random draft. During the Peloponnesian War men who were eligible to serve 
as hoplites had their names inscribed on a list, the KcnaAoyoc;.24 Call-up for mili-
tary service was conducted according to a procedure whereby only the number of 
men required for a campaign was specified. The taxiarchs, under the direction of 
the generals, recruited the appropriate number from among those who were eligi-
ble to serve (Christ 2001,398-402; Andrewes 1981, 1-2). The generals enjoyed 
significant latitude in this regard. Though they swore to select men according to a 
regular rotation, they did not always honor their oath. They regularly sacrificed 
piety to the success of the campaign, for they knew that an indiscriminate distri-
bution of service could swell the ranks with weaklings, cowards, or men who for 
any number of reasons were undesirable. There were situations in which a gen-
eral particularly wanted a specific man (or band of men) to join him, even though 
he (or they) was not technically eligible (see, e.g., Aristophanes Peace 1181-
1190). The generals required victory. When assembling a fighting force they 
sought out those men whom they thought would serve them best (see, e.g., Christ 
2001,401-402; Xenophon Mem. iii 4.5). 
At first glance, Socrates would never have been mistaken for the ideal infantry-
man. He was poor. He was almost forty when he served at Potidaea and in his 
late forties at Delium and Amphipolis. He attended particularly arduous expedi-
21 The very rich. men like Xcnophon and Alcibiades, generally rode with the cavalry. 
22 One might argue from the fact that Socrates served as a hoplite that he was not as poor as the 
sources make him out to be. Though this is possible, of course, it runs counter to all of the testimony 
we have regarding his financial situation. 
23 Diogenes Laertius relates a tradition that Socrates invested money and profited from the 
accruing interest (ii 20). 
The following account is based upon Christ 200 I and Andrewes 1981. 
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tions, which involved extended periods of deprivation punctuated by episodes of 
extreme stress. There were many other (and younger) men available for the cam-
paigns against Potidaea and Amphipolis. We must ask ourselves: How did 
Socrates come to take part in all of this? Why would the generals recruit an older 
man for strenuous service when so many others were available? Consider the 
details of Clean's Amphipolitan campaign. Socrates was around forty-eight years 
old at the battle of Amphipolis. In just two years he would have retired from 
active duty and remained in Athens with the home guard. A total of twenty-two 
hundred men took part in the campaign. There were at least six thousand hoplites 
in Athens in the summer of 422, all of whom had served at Delium two years pre-
viously and been inactive since then.25 Clean intended to assault several cities on 
the way to Amphipolis. The campaign would be protracted and especially dan-
gerous and everyone knew this (Kagan 1974, 318-319). The importance of the 
mission and the limited number of men make it almost certain that Clean or his 
close associates were personally in charge of recruiting. 26 So how did Socrates 
wind up in the ranks') He had a reputation for courage, won at both Potidaea and 
Delium. The latter battle had occurred just two years prior to the expedition to 
Amphipolis. Socrates' record of valor and bravery may very well have recom-
mended him, despite his age. Probably Clean or one of his taxiarchs invited him 
to serve. 
Would Socrates have been obliged to serve if asked? Would he have served 
without protest under a man whose character and methods he considered ignoble 
and unjust? It is surely relevant that a citizen could be excused from service due 
to poverty (see Christ 2001, 404-405). Many men of the hoplite class, men for 
whom poverty was not an issue, simply refused to serve altogether. There were 
laws against this, of course. Even so, while those who ignored the summons of 
the l(U'tUAOY0'; did not escape the disdain and ridicule of their fellow citizens, 
they seem only rarely to have been prosecuted.27 
On the other side of this coin, it was not uncommon for men to volunteer for 
military duty.28 Considering the incongruity between the evidence of Socrates' 
25 Seven thousand hoplites served at Delium in 424/3 (iv 93.3), and this was the Athenians' full 
hoplite force (iv 90.1). Approximately one thousand died there (iv 101.2), leaving approximately six 
thousand men. One thousand hoplites sailed to Scione the following summer (iv 129.1). If Socrates 
left with this group. he would have been one of only one thousand selected from a pool of six thou-
sand. If he left with Cleon, he would have been one of twelve hundred chosen from a pool of five 
thousand. When he left for Potidaea he was one of three thousand selected from a pool of over thirty 
thousand. 
26 For recruitment by indi vidual generals, see Chri st 200 I , 400n9. 
27 Pisander was known to have avoided combat (Xenophon Symp. 2.14; Aristophanes Birds 
1556 n.); so was Aristogiton (Plutarch Phocion 10). Cleonymus was a hoplite but he tossed away his 
shield and fled from battle (Aristophanes Clouds 353; Wasps 20 ff.). Amynias. too, avoided military 
service (Aristophanes Clouds 692). See also the story of Meton and his son in Plutarch's Nicia.l 13.5-
6. Plato Rep. 469d remarks that some men avoided fighting by poking around among the dead before 
the battle had been concluded. Though such men were in theory vulnerable to a charge of u<HpmEio:. 
in practice they often incurred no official penalty (Christ 2001). 
28 In 447 Tolmides, son of Tolmaeus persuaded approximately one thousand Athenian volun-
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financial situation and the facts of his hop lite service, we should not rule out the 
possibility that he was himself a volunteer. An infantry soldier could earn one 
drachma daily; and there was always the prospect of booty, especially if cities 
were to be sacked and the citizens sold into slavery.29 Precisely these conditions 
applied to Cleon's northern campaign.3o 
We should not over-estimate the influence an aypa<pos VOl-lOs might have exer-
cised on Socrates. Although there may have been cultural pressures on men of a 
certain class to serve with the hoplites, these pressures would not have operated 
on families in the laboring class. Socrates grew up in a milieu that celebrated the 
victory at Salamis and stressed service on the fleet. Moreover, as far as we can 
tell from his literary depiction, Socrates was the paradigmatic example of a man 
who is able to transcend the influence of custom; he resisted cultural pressures 
and lived his life exclusively according to what he believed to be the good. The 
average Athenian of the hoplite class may very well have been motivated by cul-
turally established ideals of heroism, virtue, service to the polis, etc. But it is hard 
to believe that such considerations could have pressured Socrates into acting con-
trary to his deepest commitments. Socrates' service as a hoplite may have been 
compatible with custom; it was not because of it. 
It is worth noting that Socrates' military career overlapped his philosophical 
career by many years, at least as Plato portrays him. The Charm ides, which 
begins with his return from Potidaea, represents Socrates at or near his philo-
sophical maturity. He would have been around forty years old at the time. He is 
obviously well known as someone deeply concerned with education in the 
Laches, which is set at least six years later, sometime after Delium. Interestingly, 
much that was distinctive about his philosophical character was associated with 
his hoplite service. His imperviousness to the elements, his frugality, moderation, 
and powers of concentration became widely known at Potidaea, as did his inti-
mate association with A1cibiades (Symp. 220a-b).31 At Potidaea and again at 
Delium he earned a reputation for courage. His philosophical reputation must 
have been well established for some time before the Amphipolitan campaign, for 
Aristophanes produced his Clouds in 423, one year prior to the expedition.32 This 
is all to say that Socrates was living as a philosopher throughout his military 
teers to fight with him at Coroneia (Plutarch Pericles 18.2). In Aristophanes' l!irds 1364-1369, Pis-
thetairas urges a young hoodlum to volunteer for a campaign in Thrace. 
29 On the distrihution and sale of booty and the sale of slaves. see Pritchett 1971, 65-H4. 
30 Similarly. on the way to Potidaea the Athenians attacked at least four other cities. When they 
exiled the Potidaeans they allowed each citizen to take only one or two items of clothing and a small 
sum of money. Whatever they left hehind presumably became Athenian property. 
31 Plutarch says that everyone marveled to see Alcibiades living, dining, and exercising with 
Socrates on campaign (Alc. 4.4). Given the influence that Alcibiades had over his peers (as demon-
strated, for example, by the effect his refusal to play the !lute had on young men of his generation 
[Ale. 2.4-6D, his association with Socrates must have contributed to the spread of the philosopher's 
reputation. 
32 If Socrates left with the first contingent. the play was presented just months before his depar-
ture. 
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career. Thus it cannot be that his hoplite service was a thoughtless indiscretion 
that his later intellectual development caused him to reject. Socrates was not a 
warrior who later became a philosopher; he was both warrior and philosopher 
simultaneously. 
Socrates' notoriety as a philosopher may have had something to do with his 
service at Potidaea. He shared a tent with Alcibiades during the campaign, which 
was most likely the young man's first military experience (Plutarch Ale. 4.4 and 
7.2; Plato Symp. 2lge). This must have been arranged, or at least approved, by 
Pericles, Alcibiades' guardian at the time. Socrates was already close to Alcibi-
ades (Symp. 21ge) and he may have associated with Pericles' circle of intellectu-
als.33 He did not meet the archaic standard for membership in the hoplite class; 
nor would he have met the later relaxed qualifications regarding total property 
worth, if in fact this change was made. It is unlikely that the requirements were 
relaxed any further than this at the beginning of the war. So, Socrates may have 
served at the request, or with the special permission, of Pericles himself. 
The evidence suggests that Socrates served bravely, sometimes even daringly. 
He must have fought in the first few ranks during the battle at which Alcibiades 
was struck and wounded by the enemy. We have already noted Alcibiades' report 
of his valor in this and other battles. Laches, who fought beside him at Delium, 
extolled his courage (Laches 181b). Socrates himself said that he stood steady in 
the ranks and faced death (Ap. 28e). In addition to all of this, there is one argu-
ment from silence that is too telling to ignore. Aristophanes delighted in ridicul-
ing known cowards. But though he produced his Clouds after Socrates had been 
in combat many times, and his intention was to parody and to ridicule, he leveled 
no such accusation against him.34 
There are innumerable opportunities in the dialogues for Socrates to challenge 
the justice of war, or to raise the possibility of a moral requirement to resist mili-
tary service, or at least to resist active participation in battle. Plato's dialogues are 
replete with references to warfare. The Charmides, for instance, begins with 
everyone begging Socrates to describe his activities while on campaign at Poti-
daea. This would have been an opportune moment for him to invite his interlocu-
tors to consider the morality of a 'preempti ve strike' in which not only 
combatants but also innocents were killed.35 Yet he does no such thing. Nowhere 
33 Plato's Menexellus 235e-236d makes Socrates close to Aspasia, Pericles' mistress. Two other 
Socratics-Aeschines and Antisthenes-wrote dialogues named after her. He is associated with her 
also in Xenophon's Memorabilia ii 6.36. He converses with Pericles' son in Mem, iii 5. Diogenes 
Laertius ii 18 says that he was reported to have been a pupil of both Damon and Anaxagoras, two of 
Pericles' close associates. Plato, in Republic 400b-c and Laches ISOd, associates him with Damon. 
For Pericles relation to Damon and Anaxagoras, see Kagan 1991,21-25, 
34 Had Socrates been opposed to war, Aristophanes could hardly have referred to him as one 
who was mad for Spartan ways (EAaKmvol.HxVOUv), regardless how meager his diet or shabby his 
dress. See Birds 1281. 
35 This remark should not be construed as in any way alluding to contemporary issues of politics 
and war. Rather, it is an allusion to, (a) Vlastos' claim with respect to his hypothetical Mytilene 
example that Socrates would have resisted because innocents were killed; and, (b) his characteriza-
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in the dialogues does Socrates give any indication that he had moral objections to 
hoplite warfare. To the contrary, in the Protagoras he says it is 'noble' (KaAov) 
and 'good' (aya8ov) to go to war (35ge).36 
There is no reason to believe that Socrates changed his opinion about war even 
at the end of his life. In 401, when Xenophon sought his advice about joining 
Cyrus' expedition against Artaxerxes, Socrates' only scruple was that the Atheni-
ans might resent his serving under the man who had lately helped the Spartans 
defeat them (Anabasis iii 1.5). He raised no moral objections to warfare as such. 
Indeed, when he looked back on his life in his final days he expressed no regrets 
for his military occupation in the service of empire. He remarked, in fact, that he 
was confident that he had never been unjust to anyone (Plato Ap. 37a; Xenophon 
Defense 3.5.26). 
Plato's Socrates says time and again that in everything we do we must con-
stantly consider how it bears on happiness and the good life (see, e.g., Ap. 28b 
and Gorgias 526d-e, 527b). His idea of the good life apparently included life as a 
hoplite. He may very well have relished the experience of battle. But to be a 
hoplite was also (we might say, primarily) a matter of status and culture. Socrates 
declined to serve in the fleet because he considered it ignoble (Republic 396b; 
Laws 707a-c). The KaAoKaya8o~, he says in the Gorgias, is happy (470e). 
Socrates associated with the KaAoKaya80i: he married into their ranks;37 he 
drank and sang with them at their symposia; he exercised and talked with them in 
their palaistrae; he visited their homes; he fought beside them on the battlefield. 
These were not the typical actions of an indigent Athenian. Socrates actively pur-
sued this life for himself; he went out of his way to live it. 
In this we see not a revolutionary but a traditionalist.38 Socrates believed in 
Athenian hoplite culture, he admired and aspired to live up to the aristocratic 
ideal of the KaAoKaya8o~. This ideal was manifested most gloriously in the 
Mapa8ffiVO!.L<XXat, the farmer-warriors who laid low the Persian might at 
Marathon. When Plato, in the last years of his life, recalled these old hoplites and 
their ways, he remarked that the land battles they fought had made the Greeks 
tion of the 'preemptive strike' as an extension of the traditional morality against which Socrates' 
'moral revolution' was directed. 
36 See also Plato's Gorgias 468b-470b, where Socrates suggests that in some cases it may be 
good and just to kill people, exile them from their homes, and confiscate their property. At Phaedrus 
248d he suggests that the life of the military commander is second only to the life of the philosopher. 
In Xenophon's Memorabilia Socrates includes learning the art of war in a list of occupations that 
make for a joyous life (ii 1.19, iv 5.10). 
37 Diogenes Laertius ii 26 informs us of Aristotle's claim that Socrates married Myrto, the 
daughter of Aristides the Just. Aristides was a cousin of Callias (who married Elpinice, Cimon's sis-
ter), whose grandson plays host to Protagoras in Plato's dialogue by that name. In Plato's Gorgias 
526b Socrates singles out Aristides as one of the very few good politicians. Aristides and Socrates 
came from the same deme, Alopece. Some connection between the two families is obvious from 
Plato's Laches 180d-181c. 
JR This is not to claim that Socrates was nothing more than a hoplite. We must not go to one 
extreme while rejecting the other. Socrates, like Aeschylus before him, and Archilochus before him, 
was a servant of the muses as well as of the god of war. 
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better men (Laws 707c). Socrates fought such battles and was such a man. He did 
not fight at Marathon himself, of course; but he stood proudly in the long line of 
hoplites that stretched back to those who did. He identified with these men and 
accepted that their way-the way of the hoplite-led most nearly to the good 
life.39 
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